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Decades of Uncertainty End with Error
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.

I. INTRODUCTION
Congress first adopted the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in 1972,
mandating that cooling water intake structures reflect the use of "best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact."2
This Congressional mandate was followed by many years of unclear
regulation by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA").3 The trend of uncertainty seemed destined to continue after the
Second Circuit struck down portions of the EPA regulations in
Riverkeeper v. EPA. 4 The Supreme Court's decision in Entergy Corp v.
Riverkeeper reversed the Second Circuit decision, ending years of
uncertainty regarding the regulation of cooling water intake structures.s
That decision seems to go against clear Congressional intent.

II. FACTS AND

HOLDING

Congress enacted the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., regulating
large power plants that extract water from nearby sources for cooling
purposes. 6 The process of extracting these large amounts of water causes
several threats to the environment.
The most serious threat,
squash nearby aquatic
structures
intake
the
when
"impingement," occurs
These structures also create the risk of "entrainment,"
organisms.
the organisms are sucked into the cooling systems. 9 To
when
occurring
129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).
3 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1503 (2009).
4 475 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
5
Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1510.
6 Id. at 1502.
2

7id.

8Id.

9 Id. See also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System - Final Regulations to
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing
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reduce these threats, § 1326(b) of the CWA requires that these ". . .
cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact."' 0
The EPA promulgated regulations to set the national performance
standards for these water intake structures." The standard for existing
facilities12 requires the use of technologies that will reduce impingement
mortality of fish and shellfish by 80 to 95 percent, and also requires
certain facilities to reduce entrainment by 60 to 90 percent.13 The
regulations list alternative ways for the facilities to meet this standard. 14
Although the EPA did require the use of closed-cycle cooling
systems ' for new facilities, it did not require this of the existing facilities.
The EPA strayed away from this requirenient due to the high cost of
forcing existing facilities to convert to the closed-cycle cooling systems.' 6
Furthermore, forcing the conversion would cause the facilities to produce
less electricity, which in turn would create the need for additional plant
construction.1 7 By accounting for these factors, the EPA conducted a costbenefit analysis when developing the national performance standards for
water intake structures. 18

Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,586 (Jul. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9,
124-25).
10 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).
" Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1504.
12 Facilities affected are those with a daily water intake flow exceeding
50 million
gallons, of which 25% is used for cooling purposes. Final Regulations to Establish
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,576. Furthermore,
the EPA had previously promulgated rules for new facilities utilizing water intake
structures. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: Regulations Addressing
Cooling Water Intake Structure for New Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256, 65,256 (Dec. 18,
2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-25).
13 Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1504.
14 40 C.F.R. § 125.94 (2007).
15 Closed-cycle systems reduce the threat of impingement and entrainment. By recirculating water, the facility is not forced to extract as much water to satisfy its cooling
needs. See Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1503.
16 Id. at 1504.
17 Id.
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The regulations also permit facilities to vary from the national
standard.' 9 Section 125.94(a)(5)(i) allows a variance if the facility can
demonstrate that the costs of complying with the standard would be
"significantly greater than the costs considered" by the agency.20
Similarly, § 125.94(a)(5)(ii) allows a variance if the costs of compliance
"would be significantly greater than the benefits of complying with the
applicable performance standards." 2 1
Various environmental groups and states petitioned for review of
these regulations, arguing that Congress did not authorize the EPA to
conduct a cost-benefit analysis when setting national performance
standards and providing for site-specific variances.2 2 They argued that the
phrase "minimizing adverse environmental impact" implies that facilities
must reduce the impact to the smallest amount that is economically
possible.2 3 They also argued that silence with regards to instructing the
EPA to consider a cost-benefit analysis shows Congressional intent to not
allow a cost-benefit analysis. 24
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the cost-benefit
analysis conducted by the EPA was unlawful and remanded the case to the
EPA to determine whether the had used a cost-benefit analysis when
creating the national standards.
Justice (then Judge) Sotomayor of the
Second Circuit concluded that the "best technology available" standard
allowed the EPA to consider the cost of the technologies and onl require
the use of technology that the industry could reasonably bear. 6 Upon
review, the U. S. Supreme Court held that the EPA's interpretation that the
"best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact"
allowed a cost-benefit analysis when creating national performance
standards was a reasonable interpretation of §1326(b), and therefore the

19 Id.
20 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(i) (2007).
21 Id. § 125.94(a)(5)(ii).
22 Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1505.
23
Id. at 1506.
24
Id. at 1508.
25 Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2007).
26
Id. at 101.
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EPA was permitted to conduct a cost-benefit analysis when setting the
national standards and allowing variances from that standard.2 7
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress passed the CWA28 in order "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 29
There are two major ways the CWA tries to achieve these goals. One is
the requirement that certain point sources 30 be subject to effluent
limitations.31 In order to limit the discharge of effluents, the CWA set up
different standards for the Agency to use in implementing limits upon the
different point sources.32 Another way the CWA achieves its goals is by
regulating cooling water intake structures in order to limit adverse
environmental impact. 33
A. Effluent Limitations
The CWA first limited effluent discharges of point sources during
*
*
*34
its initial implementation
period.
That section required existing point
sources to have "the best practicable control technology currently
available . . .," which became known as the "BPT standard.""

After the

initial period of implementation was completed, the CWA called for more
stringent limitations to be imposed for toxic and nonconventional
pollutants.36 These limitations required the "application of the best
available technology economically achievable.. .which will result in
reasonable further progress toward the national goal of eliminating the
27 Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1510.
28
29

33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006)

d

30 Point sources are defined as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance... from

which pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. § 1362(14).
3 Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1506-07.
32 See id at 1507.

1 See id. at 1502.
3
4 Id. at 1506. The initial limitations were to be imposed prior to July 1, 1977. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)(1)(A).
3s 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
36
Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1507.
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discharge of all pollutants," which became known as the "BATEA
standard."37 For the remaining pollutants (conventional pollutants) 38 the
CWA required the "best conventional pollutant control technology," also
known as the "BCT standard." 39 The last of the standards applies to
special categories of new point sources, 40 and calls for a standard of
performance that "reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction which
the Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the
best available demonstrated control technology," which is known as the
"BADT standard." 4 1
Besides setting these standards for limiting effluent discharges, the
CWA also mandates that the EPA consider certain factors when
implementing the standards.4 2 When implementing the BPT standard, the
EPA is instructed to consider "the total cost of application of technology
in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved." 43 Section
1314(b)(4)(B) requires the EPA to consider "the reasonableness of the
relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the
effluent reduction benefits derived . . ." when implementing the BCT

test.4 4 When implementing the BATEA and BADT tests, Congress
requires the EPA to consider, among other factors, "the cost of achieving
such effluent reduction." 45 Thus, while the BPT and BCT tests require a
cost-benefit analysis, the BATEA and BADT tests only authorize the
analysis of costs and remain silent on the analysis of benefits.
B. Water Intake Structures
Section 1326(b) contains the standard for regulating water intake
structures. 46 That section of the CWA requires that "cooling water intake
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
The EPA decides which pollutants are considered conventional. Id. § 1314(a)(4).
39
Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1507; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E).
40 See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A) (setting out a preliminary list of new point sources).
41
42 Id. § 1316(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1507.
3

38

43

33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B).

4
4

Id. § 1314(b)(4)(B).
Id. §§ 1314(b)(2)(B), 1316(b)(1)(B).

46

Id. § 1326(b).
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structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact," which is known as the "BTA standard." 47 Unlike
the four tests regulating effluent discharges, the BTA test contains no
factors to guide the EPA in implementing the test. 48
As a result, the EPA never had clear guidelines when
implementing the BTA test prior to the current regulations at issue in
Entergy Corp.49 Originally, the EPA proceeded on a case-by-case basis
without guidance from any regulations.50 The EPA's first set of
regulations regarding water intake structures under § 1326(b) came in
1977.51 These regulations required "[t]he information contained in the
Development Document [to] be considered in determining
whether...water intake structure[s].. .reflect the best technology available
for minimizing adverse environmental impact." 52 These initial regulations
were quickly ruled invalid in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train.53 The
Supreme Court held that the regulations were in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act because the regulations did not contain
necessary information detailing the Development Document. 54
Following the court's decision in Appalachian Power, the EPA
withdrew 40 C.F.R. § 402.ss The Agency then released a publication as a
guide in enforcing § 1326(b)'s requirements. 56 Enforcement under these
guidelines continued primarily on a case-by-case basis.57 In 1995, the
47

Id. (emphasis added).

48 Entergy

Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1507.
Id.
at
1503.
50
49

id

51Best

Technology Available for Cooling Water Intake Structures, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,387
(Apr. 26, 1967) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 402.10-12 (1977)).
52 41 Fed. Reg. at 17,387; 40 C.F.R.
§ 402.12.
53 566 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1977).
54

Id. at 457.

ss National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed.
Reg. 32956 (June 7, 1979) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 6, 115, 121-25, 402-03).
5
Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1503; see also OFFICE OF WATER ENFORCEMENT
PERMITS, INDUSTRIAL PERMITS BRANCH, U.S. EPA, [DRAFT] GUIDANCE
FOR EVALUATING THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF COOLING WATER INTAKE
STRUCTURES ON THE AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT: SECTION 316(B) P.L. 92-500
(1977), availableat http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b/files/1977AEIguid.pdf.
1 Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1503.
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EPA decided they would begin promulgating regulations under § 1326(b)
in multiple phases.58
Phase I regulations apply to new facilities using water intake
structures.59 New facilities that have a water intake flow greater than 10
million gallons per day are required to restrict flow equal to those flow
restrictions attained by closed-cycle cooling systems. 60 Facilities with a
daily intake flow between 2 million and 10 million gallons have alternate
requirements. 6 '
The Phase II regulations are the regulations being challenged in
Entergy Corp. These apply to existing facilities with water intake
structures. 62 Under these regulations, the EPA set National Performance
Standards for all Phase II facilities by conducting a cost-benefit analysis. 63
The regulations also allow for site-specific variances from the national
standard if the cost of compliance would be "significantly greater" than
either "the costs considered by the agency" or "the benefits of complying
with the applicable performance standards." 64 With this legal background,
the Court addressed the issue of whether the EPA was allowed to conduct
a cost-benefit analysis.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Entergy Corp., the Supreme Court held that it was permissible
for the EPA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis when setting national
standards and when allowing variances from those national standards.65
The Court explained that the rule in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. applied to the EPA's interpretation of the
current statute, § 1326(b). 66 This rule states that the EPA's interpretation
58

60

id.
Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 125.81 (2008).

Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1503; see also 40 C.F.R. § 125.84(b)(1).
129 S. Ct. at 1503; see also 40 C.F.R. § 125.84(c).
62
Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1504. For the complete definition of a Phase II facility see
40 C.F.R. §125.91 (2008).
63Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1504.
6 40 C.F.R. §§ 125.94(a)(5)(i)-(ii).
6
s Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1510.
6 Id. at 1505.
61Entergy Corp.,
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will be valid if it is a reasonable interpretation of § 1326(b), even if the
court believes there is a more reasonable interpretation. 6 7
The portion of the CWA at issue in Entergy Corp., §1326(b),
requires the national performance standard for cooling water intake
structures to reflect "the best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact." 68
While acknowledging that one possible
reasonable interpretation of § 1326(b) would be to require adoption of
technology that reduces adverse environmental impacts to the greatest
extent possible, the Court also found the EPA's interpretation to be
reasonable.69 The majority found that the statute could be reasonably
interpreted to require the use of technology that "most efficiently" reduces
adverse environmental impact. 70
The Court rejected the respondents' argument that the word
''minimizing" means the power plants must reduce impact to the smallest
amount that is economically possible, saying that the term "minimizing" is
a term of degree that does not require the reduction to be the greatest
possible. 7 '
To support their finding that the EPA's interpretation is reasonable,
the Court looked to other provisions in the CWA where Congress used
clear instructions when it wished to reduce pollution to the greatest extent
possible. 72 For example, the Court looked to § 1311(b)(2)(A), where
Congress required the EPA to set limits which would require the
"elimination of discharges of all pollutants."73 Similarly, § 1316(a)(1)
mandated that the standard for new point sources permit "no discharge of
pollutants." 74 The Court believed that the language "minimizing adverse
environmental impact" was less clear than these other sections in the
CWA which clearly stated the desire to reduce pollutants by the greatest
amount possible. 75 This indicated, in the Court's view, that Congress
67
68

id.
id.

69

70 Id. at

1506.

id.

1Id.
72

id.
Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(2)(A) (2006).
74
Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1506; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1).
7 Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1506.
595
73
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wanted to leave the EPA some discretion when determining the extent of
reducing adverse environmental impacts. 76 Thus, the Court concluded
that the use of "minimizing adverse environmental impact" did not
preclude the use of a cost-benefit analysis.77
Next, the Court looked at the previous standards under the CWA
used to set national performance standards for effluent discharge.78 All
four of these previous standards included statutory factors to guide the
EPA in interpretation. 79 The first two standards, the BPT and the BCT
standards, instructed the EPA to engage in some sort of a cost-benefit
analysis. 80 In the next two standards, the BATEA and BADT standards,
the EPA was instructed only to consider costs without any express
language mandating the consideration of benefits. 8 1
The respondents contended that the fact that Congress expressly
allowed a cost-benefit analysis for the BPT and BCT tests, but not under §
1326(b), shows an intent to disallow the use of a cost-benefit analysis. 82
The Court rejected this argument, explaining that all four of the previous
tests required the EPA to at least consider costs when creating the national
standard.83 Thus, if the silence in § 1326(b) shows an intent to disallow
the use of a cost-benefit analysis, as the respondents argue, then this
silence would also have to mean that Congress intended to permit no
consideration of costs. 8 4 This would indicate that the consideration of
economic "feasibility" of the technology would not even be allowed.85 If
no costs were allowed to be considered, then companies may be required
to spend large amounts of money for a very minor environmental
benefit. 86 Justice Scalia argued that this would bring a result neither the

76id

77 Id.
71Id at 1507.
79id

8o Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (2006).
81 Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1507; see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(2)(B), 1316(b)(1)(B).
82 Entergy Corp., 129
S. Ct. at 1508.
83 Id.

Id.
84
5
86

Id

Id. at 1510.

596

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 17, No. 3
dissent nor the respondents would require.87
Furthermore, the Court argued that if silence in § 1326(b) implies
the prohibition of cost-benefit analysis, then that silence would also have
to mean that the consideration of any factors in implementing the statute
would also be prohibited, which is logically impossible.88 Instead, the
Court stated that "it is eminently reasonable to conclude that § 1326(b)'s
silence is meant to convey nothing more than a refusal to tie the agency's
hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used, and if so to what
degree."89 Thus, the Court held that "it was well within the bounds of
reasonable interpretation for the EPA to conclude that cost-benefit
analysis is not categorically forbidden."90
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that Congress prohibited the use
of a cost-benefit analysis unless the costs become so high that the
technology becomes unavailable. 9 1 Justice Stevens argued that if
Congress specifically addresses an issue in one section of a statute, then
silence with regards to that issue in another section of the same statute is
decisive. 92 Stevens also looked at the other standards Congress developed
for effluent limitations and noticed that they were designed to get more
stringent as time passed.93 The silence in § 1326(b), Stevens argued, was
intentional and reflected Congress's desire to preclude a cost-benefit
analysis in order to meet the "ambitious environmental standards"
imposed by the CWA. 94 Thus, the dissent argued that the majority
skipped the first part of the Chevron analysis, which requires
consideration of whether Congress specifically addressed the issue.9 5 By

87Id.

" Id at 1508.
89 id

9 Id. Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the use of costbenefit analysis should be restricted but not wholly forbidden. Id. at 1512 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part).
91 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1516 (2009) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
92
Id. at 1517.
9
Id at 1520-21.
94
Id. at 1521.
9
Id. at 1518 n.5.
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skipping that analysis, the majority ignored the possibility that Congress
may have intended to preclude a cost-benefit analysis. 96
V. COMMENT
In deciding that a cost-benefit analysis was permitted when setting
the national performance standard, the Supreme Court allowed the EPA to
side with the power plants and industries pushing for more relaxed
standards. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically require the
use of a cost-benefit analysis, 97 this decision still goes against the interests
of environmental groups who want to require the plants to use the best
technology available to eliminate as much of the environmental
destruction as possible without regards to the costs and benefits of such
technology.98 Indeed, a plain reading of the statute seems to support the
environmental groups. By using the language "best technology available,"
Congressional wishes seemed clear - to require water intake structures be
made with the best technology that is currently available to reduce
environmental destruction.
Despite this seemingly easy interpretation of Congressional intent,
the Court relied on Chevron99 to ignore the plain meaning of the statute
and conclude that the EPA's interpretation of permitting a cost-benefit
Chevron requires a .two-step analysis in
analysis was reasonable.
determining whether agency regulations are valid. 100 First, the court
should look to see if Congressional intent is clear, and only if it is not
should the court give deference to the agency in filling the gap that
Congress left.101 Thus, the Court should only consider the reasonableness
of the EPA's interpretation if it is clear that Congress did not specifically
speak to the issue of cost-benefit analysis.102 By immediately skipping to
96

Id. (majority opinion).
Id. at 1508.
98 Brief for the Environmental Petitioners at *2, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 129 S. Ct.
1498 (2009) (No. 02-4005).
99 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
'" Id. at 842.
97

1'

Id. at 842-43.

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1518 n.5 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
102
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an analysis of whether or not the EPA interpretation was reasonable, the
majority seems to skip the analysis of whether Congress specifically
addressed the issue of a cost-benefit analysis with regards to the standard
for water intake structures.103
A closer look at other provisions in the statute shows that
Congress's silence regarding a cost-benefit analysis may be conclusive.
Congress specifically gave factors for the EPA to consider while
developing the national performance standards for effluent limitations.
The BPT standard first mandated the use of a cost-benefit analysis.1 04
This standard only applied to effluent discharges at existing point sources
and was meant only as a temporary test until the more stringent BATEA
standard took control in 1989.105 Congress was clear that the EPA was to
consider only costs when developing national standards for existing point
sources under the BATEA standard.106 Finally, Congress also adopted the
BADT standard to govern effluent discharge at new point sources. 107 This
standard was similar to the BATEA standard in that Congress only
allowed consideration of costs (with no consideration of benefits) when
the EPA developed national standards.' 08 By looking at these standards, it
seems as though Congress has intended that standards become
increasingly stringent over time. 109 The standards regarding effluent
discharges began with the BPT standard requiring cost-benefit analysis,
but over time gave way to the BATEA standard and BADT standard.
Both of these standards are more stringent in that they only allow
103 id.

33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (2006).
105
Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1507.
06

Id. Congress later amended this provision, leaving the BATEA standard to only apply
to nonconventional toxic pollutants. The remaining conventional pollutants were to be
governed by the laxer BCT standard, which did require the use of cost-benefit analysis.
Id. See also id. at 1521 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(E) (2006).
'0 7Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1507 (majority opinion) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§1316(b)(1)(B)).
08
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B)).
109
Id. Although the BCT standard took a step backwards, in that it allowed a cost-benefit
analysis, it seems reasonable to conclude this more relaxed standard was only allowed
because it applied to conventional pollutants. The more stringent BATEA standard
remained in effect for the other existing effluent discharges and only required the
consideration of costs with no corresponding consideration of benefits. Id.
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consideration of costs with no corresponding consideration of benefits.
Thus, under the more stringent BATEA and BADT standards, the best
technology is determined without looking at the benefits that result in the
use of better technology, regardless of whether or not the corresponding
benefits are small.
The dissent argued that these effluent discharge standards showed
Congress's intention that the CWA be regulated by more stringent
standards in order to meet the CWA's "ambitious environmental
standards." 110 Indeed, the fact that the BTA standard for intake structures
is silent regarding cost-benefit analysis, while other parts of the CWA
clearly require it, makes it seem like Congress's silence was purposeful.111
If this silence shows that Congress intended to preclude the use of a costbenefit analysis in applying the BTA standard, as it seems, then the
majority erred in skipping the first part of the Chevron analysis. The fact
that Congress required a cost-benefit analysis when applying the BATEA
and BADT standards shows that Congress was clear regarding the BTA
test in section 1326(b). The silence shows obvious intent that Congress
precluded a cost-benefit analysis in applying the BTA standard to water
intake structures. Because of this clear intent, there was no need for the
Court to reach the second step in the Chevron analysis and conclude that
the EPA interpretation was reasonable.
This argument seems sound, but it too has problems. Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority in Entergy Corp., points out that if the
above argument is correct then the silence in section 1326(b) must also
preclude any consideration of costS. 112 Such an outcome would have the
result of requiring the use of the best technology even if the cost of that
technology would be overwhelming.
The dissent seems to recognize this problem, but avoids the issue
by adopting the Second Circuit's approach - that Congress precluded a
cost-benefit analysis but permitted "cost-effectiveness considerations" that
1oId.at 1521 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1' See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (citing Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)) (stating that "where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another. . . , it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.").
112
neg
o
Entergy
Corp.,
129 S. Ct. at 1508 (majority opinion).
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require the use of the best technology available that can reasonably be
borne by the industry.113 Taking this approach would give "available" a
different meaning. Rather than mandating the use of the best technology
that is possible,11 4 this approach would only mandate the best technology
that is economically available.115
At first glance, it seems like such an approach is inconsistent with the
analysis the dissent offers. Any silence by Congress was intentional; and,
therefore, even looking at which technology is economically available
would be precluded since Congress did not specifically authorize this
consideration. The dissent dismisses this problem by saying that Congress
viewed a "cost-benefit" analysis with "special skepticism," and thus
wished to control the use of such an analysis while not necessarily
controlling the use of other types of analyses, namely considerations of
extreme costs that may come with implementing some technology.116
This explanation is hardly convincing, but the result is still convincing: if
technology is so expensive that it cannot be adopted, then that technology
is indeed not available.
Section 1326(b) plainly requires adoption of technology that further
reduces adverse environmental impacts. Technology that reduces adverse
impacts does not seem to be required if that technology is so expensive
that it cannot be borne by the industry. The reason is that because the
technology, even if it could reduce adverse impacts, will not actually
reduce the impacts if it cannot be adopted by the industry due to its
extreme cost. Thus, the dissents approach avoids Scalia's concern that
companies will be forced "to spend billions to save one more fish or
plankton."" 7
Such an approach appears to be consistent with the mandate of the
CWA. Looking at the other provisions in the CWA relating to effluent
discharge, it seems like Congress intended for the CWA to become
increasingly stringent. Requiring the use of the best technology for
113 Id. at 1521 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Riverkeeper v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83,
101 (2d Cir. 2007).
114 Such as closed-cycle cooling
systems.
115

Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1521 n.9 (Stevens, J. dissenting).

116 id.
117Id.

at 1510 (majority opinion).
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reducing environmental impacts without regards to the costs and benefits
of that technology is no doubt a much stricter requirement.
The approach that the dissent advocates may be the most beneficial
approach and the one Congress truly intended. Requiring the industry to
apply the best technology without regard to the costs or benefits has
several advantages. First, such a test would be very stringent and would
provide substantial environmental protection by ensuring that the best
effort be undertaken to reach the intent of the CWA of "restor[ing] and
maintain[ing] the... integrity of the Nation's waters." 118 All economic
considerations would be taken off the table and industries would not be
able to ignore the environment and get away from their obligations by
simply showing that the economic costs are "significantly greater than"
the benefits.119 This would avoid a major downfall in cost-benefit
analyses in environmental regulations. When conducting a cost-benefit
analysis in environmental situations, it is often hard to determine the
benefits that a particular technology could have on the environment. On
the other hand, it is easy to determine the exact cost that a particular
technology would impose on the industry.120 This problem can result in
agencies not requiring the use of a particular technology because they do
not believe it would have much of a benefit; although in all actuality, more
accurate results would show that the technology was well worth the
cost.121 This problem would be avoided by requiring the use of the best
technology without regards to how great of a benefit it provides for the
environment.
A second benefit of requiring the industry to apply the best
technology without regard to the costs or benefits is that such a standard
would create company incentives to better the environment. By creating
such a rigid standard, companies would have more of an incentive to
create better technologies, which would bring an even better benefit to the
environment. By requiring the best technology, the standard would give
" 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2006).
See40 C.F.R. §§ 125.94(a)(5)(i)-(ii) (2009).
1 See Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1516-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121 See id.; see also Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling
Water
Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,661 (July 9,
2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 124-25).
"9
20
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an incentive to companies to develop cheaper, better technologies for two
reasons. First, the more efficient technology would result in a cheaper
way to meet the EPA regulation. Rather than being complacent with
current technology, companies would have an incentive to create more
efficient ways of reducing environmental impacts. Second, being the first
to create the better technology would put the company ahead of others,
forcing others to play catch-up. This incentive to bring about innovations
would create a cycle resulting in companies that are continually moving
towards bettering the environment. Companies would have the incentive
to make more efficient intake structures, which would continue to have a
more positive environmental impact.122
Furthermore, third party
developers would have more of an incentive to create better technologies
because they would have an instant market for selling their new
technology.
A third advantage of requiring the industry to apply the best
technology without regard to the costs or benefits is that the requirement
to use the best technology would provide consistency and clarity that has
been lacking in this area since Congress first passed the CWA. There
could be no better national uniform standard than mandating the use of the
same technology across the board. This would ensure the same
environmental protection across the nation while also easing the concern
that some industries with close ties to the EPA could more easily get
around the national standard.123 If all industries were forced to have the
same technology, the inconsistency over the "best technology available"
that has plagued the EPA for decades would cease to exist. The strenuous
case-by-case analysis of what is regarded as the best technologyl 24 would
be replaced with a concise list of technologies the company must choose
from.
Enforcement of the standard in this way would also have pragmatic
benefits. With no more worrying about case-by-case analysis or specific
Michael C. Dorf, Why the Supreme Court Decision Upholding Cost-Benefit Analysis
Under the Clean Water Act Should Not be Used to Discredit Best-Practice Standards
(Apr.
6, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20090406.html.
123
Id. (explaining the concern that the EPA may be more favorable to some companies
and
24 allow them variances from the national standard).
122

1 See OFFICE OF WATER ENFORCEMENT PERMITS, INDUSTRIAL PERMITS BRANCH,
U.S.
EPA, supra note 56, at 11.
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on-site variances, the EPA could devote more of its time to ensuring that
the "best technology available" is in fact the best technology. Litigation
and other conflicts would also surely decrease, thus saving even more
resources. As with any rigid and clear law, violations would be clear-cut,
leaving little to no doubt when a company violates the regulations.
It remains to be seen what will happen to these regulations after the
Court's decision in Entergy Corp v. Riverkeeper. The decision was no
doubt a victory for the companies at the detriment to the environment and
its advocates. By ignoring clear Congressional intent, the Court allowed
the EPA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. Such an analysis provides a
way for companies to avoid truly using the best technology available. The
disagreement between the majority and the dissent doubtlessly represents
a split between the conservative majority and the liberal minority. The
minority, pushing for stricter environmental protection, could receive a
boost of support after this decision. Although the majority stated that the
EPA could conduct a cost-benefit analysis, the decision does not require
them to do so. It will be interesting to see if the more relaxed Bush-era
regulations allowing a cost-benefit analysis will be replaced under the
Obama administration's promise for stricter enforcement of environmental
regulations. Another boost could also come from a change on the Court.
The entrance of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan to the Court may bring a
new voice of support to strict environmental regulation. 125 Thus, although
the EPA has finally promulgated regulations regarding water intake
structures, the uncertainty may continue until clearer standards are created.
VI. CONCLUSION

After decades of uncertainty in regulating water intake structures,
the Court in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper finally upheld regulations of
water intake structures under §1326(b). Although this decision finally
Justice Sotomayor authored the Second Circuit opinion denying the use
of cost-benefit
analysis in Riverkeeper v. EPA, which was subsequently reversed by the Court in Entergy
Corp. v. Riverkeeper. See Riverkeeper v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 101 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd,
129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009). However, it is doubtful that either new Justice's presence on the
Court will change its current view on environmental regulations since they replaced
Justice Souter and Stevens who, in dissent, both agreed with Sotomayor's Second Circuit
opinion. See Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1516 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125
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brings some clarity and conclusiveness, the Court ignores clear
congressional intent at the expense of the environment. By allowing the
use of a cost-benefit analysis when determining the best technology
available for water intake structures, the Court has allowed the EPA to
ignore clear Congressional intent that precludes such an analysis. The
better and more reasonable interpretation of §1326(b) would be to follow
the result reached by the dissent, which would preclude a cost-benefit
analysis and require the use of the best technology economically available.
Although the decision brings some certainty, the Court was clear that the
EPA is permitted, but not required, to use a cost-benefit analysis. This
leaves the door open for yet more change regarding these regulations.
With a recent administration change promising stricter regulations, that
change could be just around the corner.
AARON SANDERS
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